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Background. Influenza A virus causes annual epidemics in humans and is associated with significant morbidity and mortal-
ity. Haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) gene sequencing have traditionally been used to identify the virus genotype, 
although their utility in detecting outbreak clusters is still unclear. The objective of this study was to determine the utility, if any, of 
whole-genome sequencing over HA/NA sequencing for infection prevention and control (IPC) in hospitals.
Methods. We obtained all clinical samples from influenza (H1N1)-positive patients at the Great Ormond Street Hospital 
between January and March 2016. Samples were sequenced using targeted enrichment on an Illumina MiSeq sequencer. Maximum 
likelihood trees were computed for both whole genomes and concatenated HA/NA sequences. Epidemiological data was taken from 
routine IPC team activity during the period.
Results. Complete genomes were obtained for 65/80 samples from 38 patients. Conventional IPC analysis recognized 1 out-
break, involving 3 children, and identified another potential cluster in the haemato-oncology ward. Whole-genome and HA/NA 
phylogeny both accurately identified the previously known outbreak cluster. However, HA/NA sequencing additionally identified 
unrelated strains as part of this outbreak cluster. A whole-genome analysis identified a further cluster of 2 infections that had been 
previously missed and refuted suspicions of transmission in the haemato-oncology wards.
Conclusions. Whole-genome sequencing is better at identifying outbreak clusters in a hospital setting than HA/NA sequencing. 
Whole-genome sequencing could provide a faster and more reliable method for outbreak monitoring and supplement routine IPC 
team work to allow the prevention of transmission.
Keywords. next-generation sequencing; influenza; infection control; transmission; whole genome.
Influenza A  causes seasonal epidemics, as well as sporadic, 
large-scale pandemics, in human hosts, with associated high 
levels of mortality and morbidity [1]. In immunocompromised 
and immunosuppressed children, the risk of mortality is even 
higher [2]. These patients also tend to shed the virus over a 
prolonged period, leading to higher chances of transmission 
[3, 4]. For this reason, it is important to monitor transmission 
in a hospital setting housing both immunocompromised and 
immunosuppressed patients.
Haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) gene 
sequencing have been routinely used in hospitals to con-
firm influenza outbreak clusters among patients [5–7]. Gene 
sequencing also provides information on genotypes, subtypes, 
and drug resistance in a hospital setting [3]. In recent years, 
whole-genome sequencing (WGS) has been widely used to 
conduct outbreak investigations of a wide range of infectious 
pathogens [8–11], with a few studies focusing on the epidemi-
ology of the influenza virus [12, 13]. A recent study concluded 
that, in the hospital setting, WGS did not provide any additional 
information on influenza outbreaks and transmission chains, 
compared to HA/NA gene sequencing alone [14]. This conclu-
sion is attractive, as sequencing of the influenza HA and NA 
genes is routinely used for genotyping strains [3, 4]. Here, we 
tested the value of WGS as a clinical tool for the identification 
of potential nosocomial transmission, and we discuss whether 
it could be useful in real time.
METHODS
Residual nasopharyngeal aspirate samples were collected from 
all patients who tested positive for influenza A (H1N1) at Great 
Ormond Street Hospital (GOSH) during January to March 2016. 
The study was approved under the University College of London 
Pathogen BioBank National Research Ethics Committee London–
Fulham (Research Ethics Committee number 17/LO/1530)
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Overall, 80 samples were sequenced at multiple time points 
from 38 individuals. Samples were sequenced using the Agilent 
SureSelectXT (SSXT) targeted enrichment method, as previously 
described [15, 16]. Custom 120-mer RNA baits were designed 
using a comprehensive set of influenza A sequences. Bait sets 
were validated using clinical samples from multiple hospitals 
in the United Kingdom [17, 18]. Sequencing libraries were 
prepared using the 200ng input SureSelect XT protocol and 
sequenced on an Illumina MiSeq sequencer. Sequences were 
assembled using a reference-based pipeline in CLC Genomics 
Workbench version 8.03, and consensus sequences were 
extracted with a minimum of 10X coverage. Alignments were 
made using MAFFT 7.212 [19]. Maximum likelihood trees were 
computed for the sequenced strains, along with other database 
H1N1 strains, in PhyML 3.1 [20] with 500 bootstrap replicates 
and were visualized using FigTree 1.4.2 (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.
uk/software/figtree/). Pairwise single-nucleotide variations 
were computed using the ape package (dist.dna) in R. Clinical 
data were obtained from a review of the patient records. The 
transmission network was constructed using PopART [21].
RESULTS
The patient population comprised 38 children, 32 from GOSH 
and 6 as inpatients in other hospitals, with influenza A detected 
by polymerase chain reaction of nasopharyngeal aspirates 
(Table 1). Complete sequence data were obtained from 36 
patients, while 2 patients failed sequencing. Routine epidemiol-
ogy was obtained from infection prevention and control (IPC) 
team activity: 9 of the patients developed symptoms more than 
48 hours after admission and were thus deemed to have health-
care–associated infections. There were 3 children who were 
linked by IPC data on 1 ward (cases 25, 26, and 27; Table 1) and 
considered to be an outbreak. There were 2 children who had 
recently been on another ward (cases 27 and 35) and were con-
sidered as possibly linked by IPC methods. In addition, there 
were 11 patients (Patients 37, 39, 42, 43, 58, 59, 63, 70, 75, 76, 
and 77; Table 1) linked to the haematology/oncology/immunol-
ogy/bone marrow transplant services, who shared some patient 
services and were suspected to have cross-infections, but a 
connection between those patients had not been conclusively 
demonstrated by conventional IPC.
The amounts of sequence data and read depths for 80 sam-
ples, obtained from 38 patients, are shown in Table 2. Genome 
coverage and read depth correlated well with the inverse of the 
original diagnostic real-time polymerase chain reaction cycle 
threshold values (rtPCR) (Supplementary Figure 1). We suc-
cessfully sequenced 65 samples, with a mean read depth >100X. 
The cut-off for generating whole genomes was cycle threshold 
37 (approximately equivalent to 1000 gc/ml [genome copies/
millilitre] of the original aspirate; Supplementary Figure 1). All 
samples were of the H1N1 genetic subtype 6B.1 and were phy-
logenetically distinct from the H1N1 vaccine strain used in the 
seasonal vaccine formulation (Figure 1A). An analysis of the 
65 samples, from 36 patients, revealed near identical sequences 
(3 or fewer differences) at the consensus level between samples 
taken from the same patient. Phylogenetic analyses of these 
65 genome sequences and of 24 other influenza A  sequences 
circulating during the same season identified 2 monophyletic 
outbreak clusters, with high bootstrap values, occurring in the 
hospital (Figure 1A). Based on WGS, Cluster 1 was comprised of 
Patients 25, 26, and 27, and Cluster 2 contained Patients 53 and 
54. Patients in Cluster 1 were all on the same ward at the time 
they became symptomatic, and this cluster had been previously 
identified by standard IPC procedures (Table 1). Cluster 2 was 
comprised of 2 patients, and this cluster had not previously been 
identified by IPC, as Patient 53 was initially noted to have been 
admitted with an acute infection from home. In addition, there 
was no phylogenetic evidence found for direct transmission 
between Patients 27 and 35 or between the 11 patients on the 
haematology/oncology wards. A phylogenetic analysis of HA/
NA sequences alone generated a poorly supported tree, which 
identified both Clusters 1 and 2, but with low bootstrap values. 
Moreover, the tree failed to separate the sequences within these 
clusters from other closely related strains detected in the hospi-
tal (Figure 1B). The HA/NA tree of Cluster 1 included Patient 
35, who had been readmitted 48 hours after discharge by the 
same medical team caring for Patients 25 and 26, albeit on a dif-
ferent ward, but who was not directly linked. By WGS, the virus 
isolated from Patient 35 was separated from Cluster 1 by an 
unrelated sequence. By HA/NA phylogenetic analysis, Cluster 
2 included not only Patients 53 and 54, but also Patients 45, 49, 
and 62. In contrast, WGS identified only Patients 53 and 54 as 
part of a monophyletic cluster.
To quantify further the differences between putative clusters 
of viruses and other viruses circulating during the same sea-
sonal influenza epidemic, we calculated the pairwise genetic 
differences at the whole-genome level between strains circulat-
ing within the hospital and throughout Europe during the same 
season. For completeness, we compared the pairwise genetic 
differences for whole genomes with those obtained for con-
catenated HA/NA gene segments. The concatenated HA/NA 
genes, although among the most variable parts of the genome, 
revealed little differences in pairwise distances between epi-
demiologically unrelated strains co-circulating in the hospital 
during the same season: as shown in Figure 2B, blue (with-
in-patient variation, calculated using longitudinal samples), 
red (strains from an IPC-confirmed outbreak cluster), green 
(epidemiologically unlinked GOSH strains), and purple (influ-
enza database) pairwise distances overlap with each other. In 
contrast, at the whole-genome level, within-patient pairwise 
distances, calculated from samples collected longitudinally, 
were less than 3 across the entire genome, over periods rang-
ing from 3 to 34 days (shown in blue in Figure 2A). The same 
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the confirmed outbreak in Cluster 1 (shown in red in Figure 2A). 
The 2 strains in Cluster 2 differed by 1 substitution (shown in 
green in Figure 2A). In Figure 3, we show the genome locations 
of variable sites, occurring within sequences taken from an 
individual or between sequences forming a known transmis-
sion cluster (red) and variable sites that separate epidemiolog-
ically unrelated genomes (green). The wide distribution across 
the genome and the intermingling of these 2 groups suggests 
that it is not possible to sequence any sub-genomic regions to 
distinguish within and between host variations.
The remaining GOSH strains, for which no direct epidemi-
ological link could be found, fell into 4 normally distributed 
groups, labelled 1–4 (green in Figure 2A). In 3 of these groups 
(Table 1), 12 or more pairwise differences were intermingled, 
with unrelated sequences obtained from the influenza database 
(purple in Figure 2A). In contrast, members of the group with 
6–11 pairwise changes were, with 1 exception, long-standing 
GOSH patients (Table 1). This group contained Patients 45 and 
49, whose viral sequences, although distinct by WGS, clustered 
monophyletically with outbreak Cluster 2 (Patients 53 and 
54) by HA/NA sequencing and also with Patients 40, 36, 37, 38, 
45, 49, 70, and 81 (Table 1 and Figure 4). Figure 4A shows a 
timeline of when each patient within this group was sampled 
for the first time and the relationships between patients’ influ-
enza sequences. From this, it seems that Patients 38 and 40 were 
potentially linked to each other, but not to the others. Both had 
visited GOSH as outpatients within a week of each other, but 
otherwise had no identified link (Table 1). Patients 36, 37, 45, 
49, 70, and 81 all appeared to have potential links to outbreak 
Cluster 2 (Patients 53 and 54). On further analysis (Table 1 
and Figure 4B), we found evidence for 3 putative transmission 
chains. Patients 53 and 54 presented on the same day on differ-
ent wards, but had no direct contact. It is, therefore, likely that 
they were infected from a common source. Since Patients 53, 36, 
and 37 had all attended the outpatient department within 3 days 
of each other, all 3 could have been infected by this source. 
While Patient 53 became infected within 48 hours of attending 
as an outpatient, Patients 36 and 37 did not present until several 
days (nearly 2 weeks) later, suggesting that infection may first 
have occurred in a family member. Patients 54, 49, and 81 all 
acquired influenza whilst inpatients on the surgical wards. It is 
possible, therefore, that the staff member who infected Patient 
53 also worked on the surgical wards. Thereafter, spread from 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2. Number of Clinical Samples Sequenced Successfully at Varying 
Genome Coverage and Depth of Coverage
 Number of Genomes Obtained
50% genome coverage at 1X mean depth 77
90% genome coverage at 1X mean depth 73
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surgical wards may have resulted indirectly in transmission to 
Patients 49 and 81. Of interest, Patients 53, 54, and 49 were all 
private patients, who were particularly likely to have been cared 
for by the same staff. No link could be found between Patients 
45 or 70 and other patients in the putative transmission chain. 
Patient 45 was an externally referred sample from a patient 
known to GOSH. Although there was no record that this patient 
had visited the hospital recently, it is possible that he/she had an 
unrecorded ward or outpatient visit. Patient 70 was not known 
to GOSH and presented with community-acquired influenza.
Patient 62, whose HA/NA sequence, but not the WGS, clus-
tered with outbreak 2, had pairwise distances of ≥12 (Table 1). 
This child had briefly been an inpatient on the same ward as 
Patient 54 when the latter first became unwell, but had not had 
contact with GOSH since then and did not present until 6 weeks 
later. Similarly, while the HA/NA sequence from Patient 35 
clustered with Patients 25, 26, and 27 (outbreak 1) and he/she 
was cared for by the same team, he/she had pairwise distances 
to other GOSH sequences of ≥13.
DISCUSSION
Our data suggest that HA and NA sequencing alone do not 
adequately discriminate directly transmitted strains from 
those that are co-circulating in the same location. A previous 
study, which concluded that HA and NA sequencing was ade-
quate, differed from ours in that it used sequencing to confirm 
well-founded links, only sequencing viruses from subjects 
suspected to be part of 2 outbreaks [14]. While this approach 
effectively distinguished the 2 outbreaks from each other, our 
study differed, in that we aimed to uncover previously unsus-
pected transmissions. Our approach revealed strains with 
identical HA and NA genes circulating in the same hospital 
population, as part of the same epidemic. In contrast, a phy-
logenetic analysis of WGS supported the direct transmission 
between Patients 25, 26, and 27, but excluded direct transmis-
sion to Patient 35, who had, by standard IPC methods, been 
tentatively linked to the outbreak. The closeness may, how-
ever, represent indirect transmission via other patients, rela-
tives, or staff.
Figure 1. Maximum likelihood trees for (A) whole-genome and (B) HA/NA concatenated genes. The strains sequenced in this study are color-coded by individual patients. 
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Applying standard influenza mutation rates of 0.09 muta-
tions/genome/day [22] to the samples collected longitudinally 
from the same individuals suggests that 3.18 substitutions 
would have been expected over the period of 34  days during 
which samples were collected. This figure fits well with the 0–3 
substitutions identified in this group. WGS demonstrated that 
the epidemiologically supported transmissions in Cluster 1 dif-
fered by single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) numbers sim-
ilar to those seen from within-patient, longitudinally collected 
samples (ie, 1–3 SNPs). Phylogenetic and pairwise analyses also 
supported the second cluster, as directly linked cases (Figure 2A). 
A  retrospective analysis confirmed Patient 54, although pre-
senting on the same day as Patient 53, was influenza positive 
on admission and was admitted to a different ward. Patients 
53 and 54 had, therefore, not been considered linked by IPC 
methods. However, further investigation showed that Patient 54 
had attended an outpatient unit run by the same medical team 
2 days prior to their acute infection, raising the possibility that 
Patients 53 and 54 were infected by a common source. The need 
for WGS is further supported by our failure to identify clusters 
of variable sites that would enable more limited sequencing of 
subgenomic fragments to replace WGS (Figure 3).
The phylogenetic data for the haemato-oncology patients 
among whom IPC investigations had suspected cryptogenic nos-
ocomial transmission, indicated no evidence of transmission, 
and this was supported by the pairwise genetic distances between 
them. This confirms that no breakdown in IPC had occurred in 
this unit. We observed a population of viruses circulating among 
GOSH patients (Figure 2A), which had pairwise genetic distances 
that were closer than those seen for any database viruses (6–11 
versus > 13 SNPs; Figure 2A). Although no direct links between 
the patients could be found, an examination of the case histo-
ries showed that inpatient or outpatient care by the same medical 
team during the preceding weeks linked 8/10 of these patients. 
The possibility that Patient 45, for whom no link to other patients 
could be found, but who was a long-term GOSH patient, had 
had an undocumented outpatient visit remains unproven. Our 
data suggests transmission by unsampled, intermediate sources 
that led to Patients 53 and 54 becoming infected. The pattern of 
transmissions, occurring over a period of time, suggests that the 
Figure 3. Variable sites highlighted across the genome between related (red) and unrelated (green) influenza A strains. The different segments and their respective bound-
aries are shown on top. Abbreviations: HA, haemagglutinin; MA, matrix protein; NA, neuraminidase; NP, nucleoprotein; NS, nonstructural protein; PA, PB1, PB2, polymerase protein.
Figure 2. Pairwise SNV between strains in the study. The blue bars highlight variations within an individual patient; the red bars highlight variations between confirmed 
outbreak sequences; the green bars highlight variations between epidemiologically unrelated sequences within the hospital; and the purple bars highlight variations between 
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original source may also have infected other staff or family mem-
bers and led, eventually, to the infection of Patients 36 and 37. 
There were 3 patients, Patients 54, 49, and 81, who acquired their 
infections in the hospital, resulting in prolonged stays; Patient 
36, who may have acquired the infection indirectly through 
outpatient attendance, required extra corporeal membrane oxy-
genation. Thus, the failure to interrupt this cryptic transmission 
proved costly, both medically and financially.
The use of pathogen genomic data to confirm and uncover 
putative transmission links between patients has the potential 
to be a powerful tool to aid traditional IPC approaches. We have 
shown that that the sensitivity and specificity of information pro-
vided by whole influenza genomes for the identification of true 
nosocomial clusters is greater than from sequencing HA and NA 
alone. Equally as important, we have shown that phylogenetic 
and pairwise distance analyses of WGS were able to uncover 
probable cryptogenic nosocomial influenza transmission in 1 
unit, while excluding a suspected breakdown of IPC in the hae-
mato-oncology unit. As turnaround times and per sample costs 
further decline, next-generation sequencing has the potential 
for routine use in clinical settings [18]. As hybridization times 
reduce (now 1 hour), it will be possible to generate sequencing 
material faster. In addition, newer, third-generation sequenc-
ing technologies, such as the MinION from Oxford Nanopore 
[23], have the potential for even faster turnaround times and are 
currently being tested for efficacy in real-time genotyping in a 
hospital setting. Our own experience of high-throughput, tar-
geted enrichment methods has proven WGS of influenza to be 
sensitive, generating whole genomes from 1000 copies/ml, and 
fast, with turnaround times of 3–4 days and a cost of about £100/
sample. While the infrastructure costs for high-throughput WGS 
include the purchase of robotics, low numbers of samples can be 
processed by hand. Here, we show the effectiveness of WGS and 
pairwise genetic analyses to identify direct transmissions that 
are not detected by standard IPC methods. While intensive sam-
pling of staff and relatives would also be valuable, the data from 
whole genomes may, ultimately, render this unnecessary for 
uncovering linked infections. Notwithstanding, more data from 
staff and relatives could be useful for supporting campaigns to 
improve the uptake of the influenza vaccine among immuno-
compromised patients, their families, and the staff caring for 
them. As genomic data becomes linked to records of patient and 
staff movement, identifying accurately and in real time where 
breakdowns in IPC are occurring can become reality, thus allow-
ing focused intervention to where it will have most impact. Such 
measures are likely to improve patient health and prove cost 
saving.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary materials are available at Clinical Infectious Diseases online. 
Consisting of data provided by the authors to benefit the reader, the posted 
materials are not copyedited and are the sole responsibility of the authors, 
so questions or comments should be addressed to the corresponding author.
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